



T H O M A S  M. T U O Z Z O  
1 .  I N T R O D U C T I O N  
FOR ARISTOTL~, desire is a special sort  o f  cognition. In  this essay I shall be  
concerned  to explicate and de f end  this claim, present ing  first a discussion o f  
the d i f fe ren t  kinds o f  predicative cognit ion Aristotle recognizes, and  then  
showing how desire differs f rom o the r  sorts o f  predicative cognition. I shall 
f u r t h e r  be  concerned  to show how a fundamen ta l  d i f ference  between the two 
main  kinds o f  Aristotelian cognition, sense-percept ion and  thought , '  g rounds  
the distinction be tween the two main  kinds of  Aristotelian desire, epi thum~a 
(appeti te)  and  bou~s/s (wish).' This  distinction is o f  crucial impor tance  to m a n y  
topics in Aris tode 's  ethics and  mora l  psychology, on which the account  given 
here ,  if  correct ,  should cast considerable  light. T h e r e f o r e  by way o f  conf i rma-  
tion o f  my  account  I shall turn  briefly at the end  of  this essay to two such 
topics: weakness o f  will and mora l  educat ion.  
I t  will be  useful,  be fore  we p roceed  to the main  task, to contrast  Aristotle 's  
views on  the  na tu re  o f  desire with a general  view of  desire shared by m a n y  
' Phantas/a is in some sense an adjunct to either of these; hence its division into phantas/a 
a / s ~  and/0g/st/k/(DA 433b29). Compare Dorothea Frede, "The Cognitive Role of Phantasm 
in Aristotle" in M. Nussbaum and A. O. Rorty, ed., Essays on Aristotle's "De Anima ~ (Oxford, 
199~), s79-95: "Phantas/a... does not have a faculty of its own but is 'parasitic' on sense- 
perception" (~8x). I cannot agree, however, with the argument of Michael Wedin, M/nd and 
I m a ~ / n  Ar/stoae (New Haven, 1988 ) that "imagination is not a genuine faculty in the sense 
that there is no complete act that counts as imagining something" (55). DA 427bx6-2o (reading 
phamas/a at b17) seems a decisive refutation of such a view, Wedin's remarks (74-75) to the 
contrary notwithstanding. 
9 I reserve for another occasion discussion of thumos, the third type of desire that sometimes 
appears in Aristotle's typology of desire. Like epithumia, thumos is shared by animals, and so need 
involve only sense-perception and phantas/a. 
[525] 
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c o n t e m p o r a r y  phi losophers  o f  mind,  and  which has, inevitably, influenced the  
in te rpre ta t ion  o f  Aristode.  According  to this view a menta l  state such as desire  
or  bel ief  can be analyzed into two componentsS:  its content ,  which corre-  
sponds  to the object c lause in sentences such as "John believes that  it is rain-  
ing," "Mary  desires tha t  it s top raining";  and  ano the r  e lement  which cor re-  
sponds  to the psychological verb  in such sentences. T h e  manifold  ways this 
analysis o f  menta l  states as "proposi t ional  att i tudes" can be developed~ have  
an i m p o r t a n t  fea ture  in c o m m o n :  desires der ive their  distinctive characterist ic 
o f  be ing able to mot ivate  action not  f rom their  p ropos idona l  content ,  but  f r o m  
the e l emen t  which co r re sponds  to the psychological verb  in sentences at tr ibut-  
ing desire.  T h u s  there  is no essential d i f ference  in proposi t ional  content  be- 
tween d i f f e ren t  sorts o f  proposi t ional  att i tude.  T o  quote  a recent  writer:  
"[W]hile the bel ief  and  the desire that  p have the same proposi t ional  content  
and  r ep re sen t  the same  state o f  affairs, there  is a d i f fe rence  in the way it is 
r ep re sen ted  in the two states o f  mind.  In  bel ief  it is r epresen ted  as obtaining, 
whereas  in desire, it is r ep resen ted  as a state o f  affairs the obtaining of which 
would be good."s Aristotle 's view of  desire differs fundamenta l ly  f r o m  the 
proposi t ional -a t t i tude  account  out l ined above. I t  is t rue  that  Aristotle holds 
that  desires and  beliefs have  what  may  be  called proposi t ional  content .  Yet 
what  dist inguishes desire  f r o m  belief  is not  an e l emen t  disdnct f rom this 
p ropos idona l  content .  Rather ,  there  is a d i f fe rence  in the content  itself. Aristo- 
telian menta l  states, I shall a rgue ,  are  menta l  predications;  a desire is such a 
menta l  predicat ion with a specific sort  o f  menta l  predicate ,  viz., one  with 
intrinsically mot ivat ing force. Thus ,  unlike in the c o n t e m p o r a r y  theory,  for  
Aristotle beliefs and  desires will not  have the same proposi t ional  contents.  6 
s Many theorists do not suppose that this analysis reveals ontological constituents of mental 
states, but rather reveals, e.g., the logical features of these states (cf. John R. Searle, lntent/ona//ty 
[Cambridge, 1983], 14-16). 
4 E.g., it may be held that the analogue of the psychological verbs is a relation between the 
individual that has the propositional attitude and the attitude's content, which in turn may be 
construed as an abstract object (along the lines of Frege), as a sentence in a mental language (cf. 
Jerry A. Fodor, "Propositional Attitudes" in Representafim~ [Cambridge, MA, 1981]), or even as a 
set of abstract and concrete objects (cf. the account of belief in Bertrand Russell, The Analysis of 
M/'ad [London, 19~7] ). Or the analogue of the psychological verb may be treated as some sort of 
operator or modifier of a mental predication which supplies the content of the propositional 
attitude (cf. A.J.P. Kenny, Action, Emotion and Will [London, 1963], ch. I l, esp. s31 ). 
5Dennis Stampe, "The Authority of Desire," Ph/hTsoph/~ Rev/ew 96 0987): 335-81, 355 
(emphasis in original). A similar view is reported by Russell, Analysis of Mind, 58, as that of 
"ordinary unreflecting opinion": "We think of the content of the desire as being just like the 
content of a belief while the attitude taken towards the content is different." Russell goes on to 
reject such a view in favor of a straightforward behaviorist analysis of desire. 
6 David Charles, Aristoae'sPhilosophy of Action (Ithaca, 1984) gives an interpretation of Aristote- 
lian desire that fits it into the framework of contemporary propositional-attitude theory. Thus he 
gives as a representation of a desire the formula "DES.(qb'ing is good)," where "DES." is "the mode 
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T h e  no t i on  o f  m e n t a l  predica t ion7 needs  s o m e  expl ica t ion.  As I shall use  
the  t e rm ,  a m e n t a l  p r ed i ca t i on  is a m e n t a l  act  re la t ing  t o g e t h e r  two subord i -  
na te  m e n t a l  acts in a pecu l i a r  way. T o  il lustrate,  let us take  the  o c c u r r e n t  be l i e f  
tha t  a d o g  is a m a m m a l .  (Only  o c c u r r e n t  men t a l  states will be  m e n t a l  p red ica -  
t ions in t he  sense  in which  I use  the  t e rm. )  I n  hav ing  such a belief,  o n e  
e m p l o y s  o r  exerc i ses  the  c o n c e p t  ' dog ' ,  a n d  so e m p l o y i n g  it is to have  a m e n t a l  
e x p e r i e n c e ,  d o g )  O n e  also e m p l o y s  the  c o n c e p t  ' m a m m a l ' ,  tha t  is, has  the  
m e n t a l  e x p e r i e n c e ,  mammal. F u r t h e r m o r e ,  o n e  p e r f o r m s  the  m e n t a l  act  o f  
r e l a t ing  these  m e n t a l  e x p e r i e n c e s  in a cer ta in  way; the  m e n t a l  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  so 
re la t ing  t h e m  is: (a) dog is (a) mammal. 
N o w  in this e x a m p l e ,  the  s u b o r d i n a t e  m e n t a l  acts a r e  bo th  exercises  o f  a 
concep t .  B u t  in Ar is to t le ' s  theory ,  n e i t h e r  the  men t a l  e x p e r i e n c e  tha t  I shall  
call the  " m e n t a l  subjec t"  n o r  tha t  which  I shall call the  " m e n t a l  p red ica te"  n e e d  
be  the  exerc i se  o f  a concep t ;  t ha t  is, he  recognizes  u n c o n c e p t u a l i z e d  t e r m s  in 
m e n t a l  p red ica t ions .9  A m e n t a l  t e r m  m i g h t  be  given,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  by sense  
p e r c e p t i o n ;  the  m e n t a l  e x p e r i e n c e  the brown (thing) is (a) dog m a y  have  as its 
m e n t a l  subjec t  t he  u n c o n c e p t u a l i z e d  p e r c e p t u a l  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  the  dog ' s  
b r o w n  color .  T h i s  f e a t u r e  o f  Aris tot le ' s  t heo ry  enables  it to e n c o m p a s s  a vast  
r a n g e  o f  m e n t a l  states,  f r o m  c o m p l e x  s ense -pe rcep t ions  w h e r e  o n e  u n c o n -  
cep tua l i zed  p e r c e p t  is men ta l l y  p r e d i c a t e d  o f  a n o t h e r ,  t h r o u g h  beliefs a n d  
des i res  in wh ich  on ly  o n e  t e r m  is concep tua l i zed ,  to ful ly concep tua l i zed  be-  
liefs a n d  des i res .  As I have  s ta ted above ,  the  d i f f e r e n c e  b e t w e e n  des i res  a n d  
n o n d e s i d e r a t i v e  m e n t a l  states will be  in the  n a t u r e  o f  the  m e n t a l  p red ica te :  i f  
it is conat ive ,  t he  m e n t a l  s tate is a des i re ;  i f  not ,  not .  T h e  d i f f e r e n c e  b e t w e e n  
of accepting a proposition which under certain conditions will by itself lead to action" (86). 
Charles, in faithfulness to Aristotle's texts, inshts that the predicate in propositions so accepted 
must be one of a set of "good-making features"; yet he insists that these predicates may have 
purely "descriptive meaning" (87), the conative nature of the state deriving strictly from the mode 
in which the proposition is accepted. But then the restriction on predicates does no real work; that 
is why it does not figure in contemporary theory. Charles's interpretation is an unstable mixture 
of two distinct approaches to the analysis of mental states. 
71 borrow this expression from Kenny, Action, Emotion and Will, ~29, whose theory is a 
modification of that of Peter Geach, Mental Acts (London, 1957). My use of the term differs 
somewhat from Kenny's in that, as I use the term, mental predications are mental acts, not merely 
constituents of such acts. My interpretation of Aristotle is thus in some ways closer to Geach's 
original theory (although Geach did not offer any analysis of desire, nor is it likely he would 
accept one along the lines of my interpretation of Aristotle). 
s I shall use italics for mental predications and the subordinate mental acts that figure in 
them. 
9Accordingly, mental predications, as I conceive them, presuppose neither the possession of 
concepts nor linguistic ability. As will become dear below, mental predication is a kind of psycho- 
logical association or synthesis, of which the components may be either conceptualized or 
unconceptualized. 
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the two main types o f  desire will turn on whether or  not  the conative mental 
predicate is conceptualized. 
Aristotle's theory is one of  considerable sophistication; it has to some ex- 
tent been lost sight of  by recent interpreters, who have tended to assimilate 
Aristotle's position to what I see as the very different  contemporary theory. In 
this essay I shall elucidate on the theory I am attributing to Aristode by the 
consideration o f  a number  o f  important  texts; I hope thereby to make clear 
that theory's philosophical interest and power. I shall start with the non- 
desiderative cases, and  first o f  all with the unconceptualized ones: the cases o f  
complex sense-perception. 
2 .  S E N S E - P E R C E P T I O N  
It has often been remarked that Aristode describes certain sorts o f  perception 
as though they had propositional content. '~ Thus he says that we can perceive 
that the white is (a) man (or, that the white is the son of  Diares) and that we can 
perceive that  the white is sweet. ' '  Such complex perceptual experiences evi- 
dently have a predicative structure. In all such cases, the subject o f  the percep- 
tual mental  predication is a sensible proper  to one o f  the five special senses; or  
rather,  it is the mental  act o f  perceiving such a special sensible "in itself," that 
is, the activity o f  the sense in question called forth by the special sensible 
existing in the world (e.g., the whiteness of  a surface). The  mental predicate in 
these complex perceptions, on  the other  hand,  is not  any such activity o f  
perceiving something in itself; hence Aristotle cailg predicative perceptions of  
this sort perceptions o f  things "incidentally," kata sundaeb~kos. To discover what 
exactly these mental  predicates are, we must take two different  cases sepa- 
rately: that in which the mental  predicate corresponds to something that could 
be perceived in itself, and that in which it does not. 
A case o f  the first sort is the perception that the white is sweet. Such a 
perception evidendy involves mentally predicating the sweet of  the wh/te. What 
makes this predication possible is a simultaneous perception on an earlier occa- 
sion of  the white and the sweet in themselves. Such a simultaneous occurrence 
o f  the white and  the sweet is also, in virtue of  the unity o f  the sensitive faculty, an 
'~ Stanford Cashdollar, "Aristotle's Account of Incidental Perception," Phronesis 18 
(1973): 156--75, esp. sect. IV, "Perceptive Predication," and Richard Sorabji, "Myths about Non- 
propositional Thought" in M. Schofield and M. Nussbanm, eds., Language and Logos: Studies in 
Ancient Greek Philosophy Presented to G. E. L. Owen (Cambridge, 199~), 195-98. Frede, "Cognitive 
Role of Phamasia," argues that neither sense-perception nor phantas/a can be "explicitly predica- 
tive or propositional" because they are possessed by animals (~87). This is true, ff by "explicit 
predication ~ one means a predication in which one of the terms is explicitly conceptualized. 
"Cf. DA 418a2o-~3, 425a~t-2z, ~3-27, 3o-b4 9 For other examples, see Sorabji, "Myths," 
197 n.ts. 
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experiencing of  their simultaneity? 2 In many animals this experience is enough 
to produce an association such that when, on a later occasion, one of  the two 
special sensibles is perceived in itself, there occurs in the animal, not only (say) 
the white, but also, mentally predicated of  it, the sweet. Now ex hypothesi the sweet on 
this latter occasion is not an in-itself perception of  the sweet; what, then, is it? 
Although Aristotle is not explicit on this point, it seems most probable that he 
supposes the mental predicate involves a phantasma. A phantasma for Aristotle is 
not an experiencing, but rather something that can occasion a mental activity;~3 
the experiencing of  the sweet in this case, I suggest, is occasioned by a p h a ~  
which is evoked by the perceptual experiencing of  the white. Experiencing this 
sort of  connection between two percepts is the act of  mental predication that 
constitutes (this kind of) incidental perception.X4 
We may now briefly consider the second kind of incidental perception, of  
which an example is the perception that the white is (a) man. Here the mental 
predicate corresponds to something in the world that could never be per- 
ceived in itself. Men are not, as such, proper sensibles of  any special sense; 
they are rather proper  objects of  the intellect. That is to say, a man, as such, 
cannot be cognized in an unconceptualized way, as can special sensibles; when 
one mentally experiences man, one is necessarily exercising the concept of 
man. Therefore in the sort of  incidental perception now under discussion, the 
perceptual experience, the wh/te, evokes the conceptual experience, (a) man, 
which evocation constitutes the mental predication, the white is (a) man. 
How does the perceptual concept evoke the conceptual one in these cases? 
As in the other sort of  incidental perception, there must here be an earlier, 
simultaneous experiencing of  the two, which establishes an association such 
that one can evoke the other. This raises the question of  how one might first 
have the conceptual experience, (a) man, a question to which Aristotle sketches 
an answer in An. Po. II. ]9: out of  the memory and accumulated experience of  
many perceptions animals endowed with mind extract universals. Once one 
has acquired the concept in this way, one may think it at will; but such an 
~" Cf. DA 4~5a3o--b3 . 
~SThere is a parallel in sense-perception:  the p roper  sensible produces  an a/sthi, ma in the 
sense organ,  and the activity o f  the sense occasioned by it constitutes the perceptual  exper iencing 
of, e.g., the wh/te. As Wedin,  Mind and Imagination, 36, puts it: "To have an a/sadma is not  ipso facto 
to have an awareness o f  something  and so a / s ~  cannot  be exclusively mental  items." T h e  
same can be said for phantasmata. 
~4 Deborah Modrak,  Aristotle: The Power of Perception (Chicago, 1987) takes Aristotle's failure 
explicitly to ment ion  phantas/a in his account  o f  incidental percept ion to mean that it is not 
involved in it, and is puzzled by this view (2 l o n .  5o). She concludes: "[W]ere cases o f  incidental 
percept ion not  cases o f  percept ion  p roper  . . . .  then on the most reasonable hypothesis all cases o f  
incidental  percept ion would involve phantasia" (2to n. 64). It seems to me clear that  incidental 
percept ion is not, in the sense required,  a kind o f  "perception proper .  ~ 
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exercise o f  the concept  may  also be  evoked by the in-itself percept ion  o f  one  o f  
the special sensibles, the percep t ion  o f  which f igured in the process by which 
the concept  was acquired.  (Fur ther  associations m a y  be set up  over  t ime be- 
tween o the r  special sensibles and  the concept:) F u r t h e r m o r e ,  for  Aris tode 
every exercise o f  a concept  somehow involves a sense-der ived phantasma.~s 
Wi thout  investigating the exact  relat ionship between phantasma and  exercise 
o f  concept ,  we may  say that  in this sort  o f  incidental percep t ion  the perceptual  
exper ience ,  e.g., the white, evokes  a phanta,sma that  occasions the conceptual  
exper ience ,  (a) man.  Some such story must  be correct ,  given Aristode 's  view 
that  all t hough t  requires  a phanteama. 
T h e  account  jus t  given o f  the role o f  phantas/a in bo th  sorts o f  incidental 
pe rcep t ion  allows us to make  s t ra ight forward  sense o f  the synthesis that  Aris- 
totle implies is crucial to such acts o f  menta l  predicat ion.  In  this, incidental 
pe rcep t ion  differs  f r o m  the in-itself percept ion o f  the  p r o p e r  objects o f  the 
five senses, which is s imple in nature .  Aris tode considers  this d i f ference  so 
manifes t  that  he  uses it to i l luminate  the d i f ference  be tween  the menfal  exer-  
cise o f  a s imple concepV 6 and  the menta l  predicat ion in which the exercise o f  a 
s imple concept  may  figure.~7 Jus t  as there  must  be two te rms  in any conceptual  
menta l  predicat ion,  so there  mus t  be  two distinct t e rms  in incidental percep-  
tion. F u r t h e r m o r e ,  Aristotle is clear that  falsity depends  upon  some synthe- 
sis;~Sjust as the intellection o f  a concept  cannot  be false, so a s imple percept ion  
cannot  be. Incidental  percep t ion  can be false, and so needs  to be the synthesis 
o f  two things that  may  be r ighdy  (or wrongly) so combined.  
*sCf. DA 431a16--17, 43,a8-to, Mna. 449b31-45oal. 
,6 Traditionally it has been thought that for Aristotle one can think of a concept on its own, 
without entertaining any proposition in which it figures. (A. C. Lloyd, "Non-Discursive Thought-- 
An Enigma of Greek Philosophy," Proct~dings of the AriaoUlian Society 7 ~ [1969-7o]: a61-74, 
accepts this traditional interpretation and argues that Aristotle's position involves a contradiction.) 
Today widespread acceptance of the Fregean claim that "words only have meaning in the context of 
a sentence" (see John Wallace, "Only in the Context of a Sentence Do Words Have Any Meaning," 
Midwest Studies in Ph//osophy * [ t977]: 3o5-x5) has made such a position seem "bizarre, unplausible, 
unintelligible" (the view of Lloyd, "Non-Discursive Thought," ,63), and some scholars have sought 
to show that for Aristotle concepts have no mental life outside of mental predications (Terence 
Irwin, Aristotle's First Principles [Oxford, 1988], 3s3, and Christopher Gill, "Is There a Concept of 
Person in Greek Philosophy?" in Stephen Everson, ed., Compan/on to Ancw~ Thoug~ ~: P~cho/ogy 
[Cambridge, 1991], 189; see also Sorabji, "Myths"). 
,7 "Assertion predicates something of something, as an affirmative assertion does, and is in 
every case either true or false. This is not always the case with thought: the thinking of the 
definition in the sense of what it is for something to be is true, and does not predicate something 
of something; but, just as while the seeing of the special object of sight is true. seeing whether the 
white object is a man or not is not always true, so too in the case of things which are without matter 
[i.e., are intelligible]" (DA 43ob,6--3 o, reading Msper h~ kataphtu/a at 43ob26f.). 
ISSee, besides DA 43ob~6--3o (quoted in previous note), DA 43ob1-*: "Falsehood always 
involves a combining [en sunt.hgsel]";_also,4$oa26-28, 432al 1-12, Meta. ]o12a~- 5, lo~7b26-=27. 
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I n c i d e n t a l  p e r c e p t i o n  is no t  the  on ly  sor t  o f  p e r c e p t i o n  tha t  can  be  false. 
T h e r e  is a f o r m  o f  in- i tsel f  p e r c e p t i o n  tha t  is no t  the  p e r c e p t i o n  o f  a sensible  
p r o p e r  to  o n e  o f  the  five senses:  p e r c e p t i o n  o f  the  " c o m m o n  sensibles" 
(change ,  rest ,  shape ,  size, n u m b e r ) ,  so-cal led because  they  a r e  pe r cep t i b l e  "in 
c o m m o n "  by m o r e  t h a n  o n e  o f  the  five senses.*9 Th i s  sor t  o f  p e r c e p t i o n  is the  
o n e  mos t  l iable to e r r o r ,  Ar is to t le  tells us;~ ~ it canno t ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  be  s imple ,  a n d  
m u s t  involve  synthes is  o f  s o m e  sort .  "l We  m a y  ask the  s a m e  ques t ions  o f  this 
synthesis  as we  have  o f  the  two k inds  o f  inc identa l  pe rcep t ion :  w h a t  exact ly  is 
associated,  a n d  h o w  is this associa t ion e f fec ted?  A n d  m o r e  specifically, is 
phanta , /a  i nvo lved  he re ,  too? 
I f  the  p e r c e p t i o n  o f  the  c o m m o n  sensibles involves a synthesis ,  it m u s t  be  
one  in which  a p e r c e p t u a l  e x p e r i e n c e  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  to a c o m m o n  sensible  is 
c o m b i n e d  with  the  p e r c e p t u a l  e x p e r i e n c e  tha t  is the  in- i tself  p e r c e p t i o n  o f  a 
p r o p e r  sensible  o f  o n e  o f  the  five senses.  A n  e x a m p l e  o f  such  a p e r c e p t i o n  o f  a 
c o m m o n  sensible ,  t hen ,  wou ld  be  the  m e n t a l  p red ica t ion  tha t  the wh/te/s round. 
T h e  associa t ion  t ha t  m a k e s  this p red i ca t ion  possible m u s t  d i f f e r  f r o m  tha t  
invo lved  in cases o f  inc iden ta l  p e r c e p t i o n ;  fo r  in the  la t ter  cases t h e r e  is an  
o r ig in  to t he  p e r c e p t u a l  p r e d i c a t e  dis t inct  f r o m  its p red ica t ion  o f  a p e r c e p t u a l  
subject ,  w h e r e a s  h e r e  t h e r e  is n o t . "  T h u s  it would  seem tha t  phantasia does  no t  
p lay a ro le  in the  p e r c e p t i o n  o f  c o m m o n  sensibles: ' s  no  phantaama o f  an  ear l i e r  
p e r c e p t u a l  e x p e r i e n c e  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  to a special  sensible,  no  p h a n t a s m  o f  an  
ear l i e r  c o n c e p t u a l  e x p e r i e n c e  is e v o k e d  by the  p e r c e p t u a l  e x p e r i e n c e ,  the 
wh/u. Ar is to t le  insists tha t  a c o m m o n  sensible  is no t  pe rce ived  incidental ly ,  bu t  
in itself; ye t  it is a lso p e r c e i v e d  v/a the  p e r c e p t i o n  o f  the  p r o p e r  sensible.~4 T h e  
~9 Not because they are perceived by some faculty called "the common sense" (so Modrak, 
Power of Percept/on, 63, and many others). On this see especially Wolfgang Welsch, A/sthes/s. 
Grumtzflge und Perspektiven dec Ans" totelischen Sinneslehre (Stuttgart, 1987), 282-96. 
*~ D A  428b92-95. 
,, Aristotle never explicitly says that perception of the common sensibles involves synthesis, 
nor does he ever give a propositional expression of the content of such a perception; but that he 
does think it involves a synthesis is a reasonable inference from his views about its liability to 
falsehood and the nature of falsehood. So Andreas Graeser, "On Aristotle's Framework of 
Sensibilia" in G. E. R. Lloyd and G. E. L. Owen, ed., Ar/stot/e on M/nd and the Senses (Cambridge, 
t978), 86, and Wolfgang Bernard, Rezept/v/t~ und Spontane/tdt der Wahrnehmung bei Ar/stote/e.s 
(Baden-Baden, t988), 8t. Welsch, A/sthes/s, 273-76 , convincingly argues that "die Wahrnehmung 
yon ko/na wesensm~issig auf die yon/d/a gestfizt, mithin also in/d/on-Wahrnehmung fundiert ist" 
(275). 
.I This is the brunt ofDA III.1. 425at4-bl 1. 
.s Irwin, First Principles, 3 ~ 6, argues that Aristode should have recognized a role for phantas/a 
in the perception of common sensibles on the ground that (to simplify somewhat) the comparison 
of proper sensibles involves memory which involves phantas/a. 
t4 This intermediate position perhaps accounts for Aristotle's much-discussed apparent con- 
tradiction in saying, in the same chapter, both that the common sensibles are perceived "inciden- 
tally" (425ax5) and that they are perceived "not incidentally" (425a98) (so Welsch, A/sthes/z, 287- 
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most likely account seems to be that the in-itself perception of  (say) the round 
is mediated by the perception of  the white against the background of  a differ- 
ent color.~S The perception of  a proper  sensible of  any of  the five senses will 
involve perceiving it in some way against the backdrop of  other values in the 
range of  that sense; and such perceiving against a backdrop will always bring 
with it the awareness of  some common sensible. "6 (E.g., to perceive a tone will 
be to perceive it start against a background of  silence or of  another tone, 
which brings to light the common sensibles of  change and number.) Thus 
every sense is suited to perceive not only its proper sensibles, but also (at least 
some of) the common sensibles, in themselves. If  we had only the sense of  
sight, we might not realize that the shape of  the white against a blue back- 
ground was a different sort o f  sensible from the white and the blue; but 
possessing the sense of  touch, which can sense the shape of  the hard against 
the soft, we realize that shape, though perceived in itself, is indeed a different 
sort of  sensible from the sensibles proper to each of  the five senses: precisely a 
common sensible. 
The synthesis involved in the perception of  a common sensible, then, is a 
synthesis of  two perceptual experiences, each of  which is a perception of  
some sensible in itself; because the perception of  the one is mediated (in the 
way explained) by the perception of  the other, the synthesis of  their corre- 
sponding perceptual experiences is a mental predication. Furthermore, both 
terms of  this mental predication are unconceptualized; like the mental predi- 
cation involved in the incidental perception of  a proper sensible, the mental 
predication in the perception of  a common sensible has as terms perceptual 
experiencings, and so is possessed by nonhuman as well as by human 
animals. 
~. PHANTASIA 
Above we discussed the three different sorts of  perception Aristotle recog- 
nizes: the perception of  proper sensibles, that of  common sensibles, and that 
of  incidental sensibles. Of  these, the perception of  incidental sensibles involves 
p h a ~ .  We need now to investigate more fully the nature ofphantasmata 
and the sorts o f  mental predication in which they may be involved. 
94, esp. 292 n. 99). See Joseph Owens, "Aristotle on Common Sensibles and Incidental Percep- 
tion," Phoenix 36 (198~): 215-36, for a thorough review of discu~ions of  this problem. 
9 s This is essentially the view of Bernard, Rezept/v/~ und Spontam,/~, 115-3~, following the 
Greek commentators: "[Der Unterschied zwischen Idia und Koina besteht] darin, dab Idia direkt 
ein Erleiden des Sinnesorgans bewirken, Koina hingegen nur indirekt (aber nicht akzidentell, das 
heigt, ohne Bezug zu ihrem Wesen), well sic charaketeristische Kombinationen yon Idia 
hervorrufen" (113)- 
~ T h u s  Aristode says that the common sensibles "accompany" the proper sensibles (DA 
425b 5, 8). 
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The incidental perception of  proper  sensibles (e.g., that the white is sweet) 
involves a phantasma corresponding to the mental predicate; this phantasma 
itself can only be evoked because an earlier in-itself perception of  the sweet 
produced a phantasma. But perceptual experiences of in-itself sensibles are not 
the only ones which give rise to phanta, cmata; so do occurrences of the percep- 
tion of  incidental and common sensibles. Furthermore, the nature of  the 
phantasma produced varies with the kind of  perception producing it: whereas 
in the case of  the simple, nonpredicative perception of  special sensibles the 
resulting p h a ~  is itself simple, in cases where the original perceptual 
experience is predicative, so too is the resulting phantasma. Only on this suppo- 
sition can we make sense of  Aristotle's account of  the possibility of  error in 
one's phantasma: "The motion which is due to the activity of  sense [= phantasm] 
in these three modes of  its exercise will differ; the first kind of  derived motion 
[from perception of  proper sensibles] is true when the sensation is present; 
the others may be false whether it is present or absent, especially when the 
object of  perception is far off" (DA 4~8b95-3o). As we have seen, for Aristotle 
falsehood is only possible when synthesis is involved; thus the possibility of  
falsehood is the case of  the phantas/a of  incidental and common sensibles 
guarantees their compound status. Nor does the present passage suggest that 
the phantgs/a of  proper  sensibles must be complex because they can be false. 
For the present passage does not say that they can be false. Like a proposed 
definition, the phantasma of a proper sensible can either hit or be off  the mark; 
and while Aristotle is prepared to call the former case an instance of  truth 
(though in a different sense than the truth of  propositions),~7 he denies that 
the latter is a case of  falsehood. 
On the account I have so far given, Aristotle recognizes one type of  simple 
perception (that of  proper sensibles), two types of  predicative perception that 
do not require concepts (perception of  the common sensibles and incidental 
perception of  proper  sensibles), and one type of  predicative perception that 
does require a concept (incidental perception o f  an intelligible, e.g., of  a 
substance). The last of  these occupies an interesting borderline between per- 
ception and thought. ~8 It involves not the mental predication of  one percep- 
tual experiencing of  another, but rather a mental predication that may seem 
9 7 On the difference between these two different senses of  truth, see Meta. lo 5 lb l  7-~8. 
9 LSuch cognition could be called dora met' aisth~se& and is apparently what Plato meant by 
phantasia (see Sophist 264a-b ). That Aristotle should criticize this as an account of phantas/a (DA 
428a94-b9) while himself recognizing the importance of the phenomenon is not atypical of  his 
relationship to Platonic doctrine. For a discussion of Aristotle's response to Plato's account of  
phantasia, see Gerard Watson, "Phan/~ts/a in Aristotle, De Anima 3.3," C/ass/ca/Quarter/y 32 (1982): 
loo-~ 3, who does not, however, see that Aristotle recognizes something similar to Platonic 
phantas/a. 
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more familiar to us, one in which a conceptualized mental predicate is asserted 
of an unconceptualized mental subject. The importance of  this sort of percep- 
tion for action is obvious. It is what allows our general views to be applied to 
particular situations. Perceptions of  this sort figure in deliberation, especially 
at its close,~9 and when Aristotle says, concerning moral choice, that "the 
discernment [kH~/s] rests with perception,"3o and when he compares p h r o ~ s i s  
with perception,~' this is the sort of perception he means. Now Aristotle also 
treats incidental perception of  this sort as belief, since it involves a concept and 
can serve as the last premise in a train of reasoning leading to action.S2 This 
however should not give us pause; as mediator between the universal and the 
particular, this sort of cognition combines features of  both perception and 
thought. 
4" T H O U G H T  
Our interest here is not in Aristotle's theory of thinking in general, but only 
insofar as it is relevant to our proposed analysis of desire as a special form of 
mental predication. We are thus concerned only with Aristotle's account of  
predicative thought. The incidental perception of  intelligibles we have just 
discussed may be considered one such kind of thought; another is that in 
which both the subject and the predicate are conceptualized. What about the 
remaining case of  mental predication, that in which the subject is conceptual- 
ized, but not the predicate? Such a case would be one, for example, in which 
one would think of  a rose, which thought would then evoke a phantasma which 
occasioned the unconceptualized mental experience corresponding to red or 
to a particular fragrance. This sort of cognition seems perfectly intelligible; so 
far as I know, however, Aristotle does not seem to take notice of it in nonac- 
tion contexts. I shall argue belowJS however, that postulating Aristotle's recog- 
nition of  such a sort of  cognition helps make sense of what Aristotle says about 
one type of  weakness of  will. I f  my argument proves successful, then we shall 
have grounds for saying that Aristotle recognizes all four kinds of mental 
predication to which the permutation of  conceptualized and unconceptu- 
alized terms give rise. 
Having completed a survey of  the basic forms of mental predication in 
Aristotle, we may now turn to the analysis of those mental predications that 
are desires. 
nCf .  E N  121 ~b34-1113a~. 
~~ t 1o9b2~-23, t 126b4- 5. 
s, E N  t s42a~6-3o.  
~ E N  s 147az5-~6: "The one opinion [doxa] is universal, the other is concerned with particu- 
lars, and here we come to something of which perception is in control." Cf. also t 14769--to. 
ss Section 8. 
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5" DESIRE W I T H O U T  P H A N T A S I A  
The  most important  passage for the predicative nature of  desire is DA III.  7. 
The  passage o f  most immediate relevance to us starts as follows: "To per- 
ceive is like bare pronouncing and thinking [t~i phanai monon kai noein], but 
when [it perceives something] pleasant or painful, [the soul] as if affirming 
or denying [/w/on kataph~a ~ apophasa], pursues or avoids" (DA 431a8-1o). In 
comparing perception to "bare pronouncing and thinking," Aristotle must, I 
think, be compar ing it to the nonproposit ional thinking of  a simple con- 
cept.34 In the preceding lines he has been discussing how the sensible leads 
the sensitive faculty out  o f  potentiality into actuality (431a4-7), which ac- 
count applies only to the in-itself perception of  a proper  sensible;s5 in the 
present passage he goes on to discuss a predicative synthesis into which such 
a perceptual experience can enter, one that is different,  however, f rom the 
syntheses in incidental or common perception we have already discussed. 
The  second term in the synthesis under  discussion here seems to be the 
(unconceptualized) experience, the pleasant or the painful; when it is the 
former,  the animal moves towards the thing perceived, when the latter it 
moves away f rom it. This connection with motion is one of  the distinctive 
marks of  this sort o f  mental  predication which, unlike those studied so far, is 
conative. But let us leave the connection with motion aside for the moment,  
and ask the questions we have been asking about the other mental predica- 
tions: what is predicated o f  the perceptual experience caused by the proper  
sensible, and  how is the predication effected? 
The  answer to the first question seems already to have been given: it is the 
pleasant or  the painful, mental experiences in their own right, that are associ- 
ated with the proper  sensible. And  although, as we shall see, there are cases in 
which these conative mental  predicates are mental experiences involving a 
phantasma, there must be a more fundamenta l  sort of  desiderative mental 
predication which does not  involve a phantasma. For were a phant~ma always 
involved, then conative mental  predications would always be incidental percep- 
tions of  the pleasant and we would need to posit some nonincidental percep- 
tual source to account for the phanb2.vn~, i.e., a special sense for pleasure and 
pain.36 Besides being implausible in itself, such a view conflicts with Aristotle's 
analysis of  pleasure as (supervenient On) unimpeded activity of  a well- 
s4 Charles, Philosophy of Action, 85, holds that Aristotle's comparison here works as follows: 
perceiving (propositionally) : desiring :: saying or entertaining a proposition : asserting that 
proposition. 
ss This explains why Aristotle says that proper sensihles are "sensibles in the strict sense, and 
are that to which the being [ous/a] of each sense is naturally fitted" (DA 418a24-25). 
s~The argument I construct here is analogous to the one Aristotle gives (DA III.1) for the 
claim that there is no special sense for perceiving the common sensibles. 
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condi t ioned sense37 on  the best o f  its objects.38 T h e  pleasant and the painful ,  
then,  must  be perceived in a way analogous to the co mmo n  sensibles: they are 
perceived in themselves, but  in a way essentially mediated by the activity o f  the 
p rope r  senses. 
T h e  passage quo ted  above continues as follows: "Being-pleased or  being- 
pained is being active with the perceptive mean towards what  is good or  bad, 
as such. Both avoidance and desire, when actual, are identical with this. T h e  
faculties o f  desire and avoidance are not  different ,  e i ther  f r o m one ano the r  or  
f rom the faculty o f  sense-perception;  but  their  being is d i f ferent"  ( 4 3 ] a l o  - 
14). When  we are pleased, we are active with (or: actualize) the percept ive 
mean;  this confirms the suggestion that being pleased is essentially connected  
with the opera t ion o f  sense-perception.  Tha t  is to say, the  pleasant is not  
perceived in a merely incidental way.39 Fur thermore ,  this passage tells us that  
the percept ion o f  the pleasant, which we have seen to be a predicative percep-  
tion that initiates movement ,  is identical both with active desire, as we might  
have expected,  and  with being pleased, as we might  not.4o What  may at first 
seem not  to fit with the theory  o f  desire as we have in te rpre ted  it so far  is the 
claim he re  that this desire is the percept ion o f  good or  bad, as such. For  this 
claim might  suggest that it is the good that  is perceived along with the p r o p e r  
sensible, not  the pleasant. But  this problem is illusory; the good is not  to be 
contrasted here  with the pleasant, but  r a the r  identified with it. Aristotle wants 
to indicate why it is that  percept ion o f  the pleasant (unlike percept ion o f  the 
common,  p roper ,  and incidental sensibles) can initiate motion.  In Aristotle's 
theory  o f  action, it is the cognition o f  the good4' that initiates motion;  he re  he  
tells us that  the fo rm cognit ion o f  the good takes at the sensory level is pre-  
cisely percept ion o f  the pleasant.4~ T h e  unconceptual ized mental  exper ience  
o f  the good is the exper ience  o f  being pleased.4s 
s~ I leave aside here the pleasure of contemplation, which Aristotle analyses in parallel fashion 
as (supervenient on) the unimpeded activity of an excellently conditioned m/rid on the best of its 
objects. 
ssSee EN 1174b14-1175a 3. 
s9 In incidental perception the faculty of perception is not affected by the incidental percepti- 
ble (DA 418a23-24); that is, we are not active with the sensitive mean towards the incidental 
perceptible, as such. 
4oThis is rightly emphasized by Welsch, Aisthesis: "Nicht entsteht, diesem Aristotelischen 
Ansatz zufolge, Lust dadurch, dab ein Streben sein Ziel erreicht, sondern es entsteht gerade das 
Streben erst dadurch, dab Lust erfahren wird" (393)- 
41Cf. DA 433a~7-~9, b8-9, 15--16 (to prakton agathon); MA 7oob24-~9 (quoted and discussed 
below, in section 7), 7olaf4. Cir. also Meta. 1o79a27-~8. 
4, So too Henry S. Richardson, "Desire and the C, tx~ in DeAnima," in M. Nussbaum and A. O. 
Rorty, eds., Essays on Aristotle's "De Anima ~ (Oxford, 199~), 395 n. 4 L 
4s This does not mean that the concept of the good and the concept of the pleasant are the 
same; see further below. 
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As in the case o f  the common sensibles, Aristotle does not give any explicit 
t reatment  of  the mental  predication involved in the perception of  the pleasant; 
however, his discussion of  the desire felt by animals possessing only the sense o f  
touch gives us some sense of  how he conceives this predication to work. Ani- 
mals, by definition, must  have some sensation; while there is no necessity that 
stationary animals have the other  senses, they must have touch. For "where 
there is immediate contact the animal, if it has no sensation, will be unable to 
avoid some things and  take others, and so will find it impossible to survive" 
(434 b 16-18). What  is passed over in this passage is a specification of  the content 
of  the perception that initiates this motion, and its relation to touch and the 
proper  sensibles of  touch. An earlier passage addresses these points: 
If  any living thing has the faculty of sense, it also has that of desire [to 0rekt//um] . . . .  
Now all animals have one sense at all events, namely touch, and whatever has a sense 
has pleasure and pain, and the pleasant and the painful; and whatever has these, has 
bodily desire [epithuraia]: for this is desire of the pleasant. Further, they have the sense 
for food, for touch is the sense for food: the food of all living things consists of what is 
dry, moist, hot, cold, and the sense for these is touch (which is a sense for the other 
sensibles incidentally) . . . .  Hunger and thirst are forms of desire [ep/thum/a], hunger a 
desire for what is dry and hot, thirst a desire for what is cold and moist; and flavor is as 
it were a sweetener of these [h~dusma tO. (414b1-13) 
Bodily desire is desire for the pleasant; hunger  and thirst are forms of  bodily 
desire, and hence are desire for the pleasant; yet hunger  is also desire for the 
dry and hot, and thirst desire for the cold and moist. Now the dry and hot, 
and the cold and moist, are proper  sensibles o f  the sense o f  touch. It would 
seem, then, that hunger ,  in the simplest case, consists in the perception by 
touch of  something dry  and  hot, and the concurrent  perception of  it as pleas- 
ant, which initiates the movement  of  grasping the thing. Tha t  is to say, the 
desire is a mental predication in which the subject is the dry and hot and the 
predicate, the pleasant. This mental  predication, in which both terms are 
unconceptualized, is conative. O f  course, not every perception of  something 
hot and dry brings with it a perception of  that thing as pleasant; presumably a 
certain state o f  the body of  the animal is required for that. Nonetheless, given 
that condition o f  the body, the perception of  (certain of) the proper  sensibles 
o f  touch brings with it an actual, nonincidental,  in-itself perception of  the 
pleasant. As in the case of  perception of  the common sensibles, so here it 
would seem that no phantasma is involved.44 
Desires of  this sort thus do not involve phantas/a in the strict sense. Many scholars (e.g., 
Martha Nussbaum, Aristotle's "'De Motu Animalium" [Princeton, 1978 ], Essay 5; Irwin, First Princi- 
ples, 3oo, 3o4-3o5) have argued that phanta.6a is involved whenever something is seen-as some- 
thing elsemin my terms, whenever a perception has predicative structure. For a treatment of 
passages which have been taken to sho w that phantas/a is involved in all desires, see note 49 below. 
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One  peculiari ty ( f rom our  perspective) of  Aristotle's account as I have 
presen ted  it is that desire, as a percept ion o f  the pleasant, is itself an experi-  
encing o f  pleasure.~s T o  be sure, it is not  an unalloyed exper iencing o f  
pleasure;  the bodily condit ion which makes objects o f  this sort pleasant may 
well be in itself painful,  so that  the experience o f  the desire is, overall, a 
painful  one. In fact, we can see the movement  initiated by desire as a move- 
ment  on  the animal's part  f rom a state where pleasure is outweighed by pain 
to one  in which the opposite is true. In the simple case u n d e r  consideration, 
this state comes about  when the animal "takes" (cf. labein, 434b17) - - tha t  is, 
e a t s - - t h e  pleasant object.4~ 
6.  DESIRE WITH P H A N T A S I A  
In the simplest case o f  desire, then,  there  is no role for  phantas/a in the strict 
sense. But  the in-itself percept ion o f  the pleasant, like all perceptions,  gives 
rise to a phantasma. Like the phantasma produced  by the percept ion o f  co mmo n  
sensibles, and for  similar reasons, the phantasma p roduced  by the percept ion 
o f  the pleasant must  be complex:  it must have a predi~ative structure,  with one  
const i tuent  phantasma cor responding  to the p roper  sensible(s) whose percep-  
tion media ted  the percept ion o f  the pleasant (e.g., the hot  and dry), and with 
ano the r  cor responding  to the pleasant. This complex phamasma somehow 
remains in the animal, to be evoked at a later time and to occasion thereby the 
co r respond ing  mental  experience.  T h e r e  are two ways that this can happen,  
o f  which the first is relatively straightforward.  We noted  in the last section that 
the percept ion  o f  certain p r o p e r  sensibles does not  invariably give rise to 
percept ion o f  the pleasant (i.e., to a desire), but does so only when certain 
bodily conditions obtain. But it would be odd to suppose that when those 
conditions obtain, animals cannot  exper ience  desire unless they actually per- 
ceive the p r o p e r  sensibles that  they find (in those conditions) pleasant. Aris- 
totle's view, ra ther ,  is that the bodily conditions themselves tr igger a complex 
phama.m~a which occasions a mental  predication in which the pleasant is predi-  
cated o f  (as it may be) the hot and &y.47 
45 See my discusion of DA 431 a ro-14 above. Plato, too, holds that desire involves an element 
of pleasure, though his analysis of how it does so differs from Aristode's. See Ph//eb~ 34d-36b 
and 47c--d. 
46 The eating itself is a pleasure felt by the sense of touch (EN 1118a23-b l, EE 1231 a 15-~ 1). 
47 Simplicius, too, recognizes that phamas/a must play a part in desire when there is no actual 
perception of the thing desired: "But even the least animals have an indefinite phamasia, so that 
they may desire that which is absent" (In Libros Aristoteli~ De Aroma C0mm~rm, ed. M. Hayduck 
[Berlin, 1882] = Commezaaria m A ~ l e m  Grae~ XI, 1o~.8--9). This consideration seems to me 
decisive against the view that Aristotle denies phamas/a to stationary animals (compare Wedin, 
Mind and Imagim~um, 41-42 and n. 21). DA 428a8-11 is merely an em/0xon that is revised at DA 
434a3-5. 
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The mental predicate the pleasant is distinctive from other unconceptu- 
alized mental predicates in being conative: mental predications in which it 
figures can give rise to movement on the animal's part. The two cases of  desire 
so far discussed, however, can give rise to only the simplest of  movements. 
The actual perception (by touch) of  the sensibles the body requires prompts 
the animal to consume what it touches. Imagining those sensibles v/a a com- 
plex phantasma presumably prompts random movements which will lead, if all 
goes well, to the actual perception of  the sensibles in question.~ a These rudi- 
mentary movements comprise the repertory of  only the simplest, stationary 
animals; animals capable of  locomotion have other senses, besides touch, 
which enter into a more complex mental process connecting desire and move- 
ment. This more complex process involves, not only mental predication, but 
also certain operations involving several such predications, operations which 
are syllogistic in form. The predications which we are concerned with at 
present are still those with unconceptualized terms, and the syllogistic opera- 
tions involving them are performed by animals as well as by humans. What I 
shall be outlining is in essence a theory of the unconceptualized practical 
syllogism. As we shall see, Aristotle's theory of  human action involving 
thought is an extension of  this theory. 
Aristode tells us that the higher senses belong "not to any and every kind 
of  animal, but to some; that is, they must belong to an animal capable of  
forward motion ItS/poreut/k~']; for, if it is going to survive, it must perceive not 
only when it is touched but also at a distance" (DA 434b~,4-~7). How he 
envisions that the higher senses are employed in animal desire can be seen in a 
passage from the Nicomachean Ethics: "Nor is there in animals other than man 
any pleasure connected with those senses except incidentally. For dogs do not 
delight in the scent of  hares, but in eating them; but the scent gave them the 
perception of  the hares. Nor does the lion delight in the lowing of  the ox, but 
in eating it; but he perceived by the lowing that it was near, and therefore 
appears to delight in the lowing. And similarly he does not delight because he 
sees a 'stag or wild goat', but because he is going to have a meal" (1 t 18a 16- 
~3). In Aristotle's examples an animal perceives a sensible proper to one of  the 
special sensibles in itself; pleasure, he tells us, is connected with this percep- 
tion incidentally. There is a middle term in these examples, which is con- 
nected nonincidentally to the animal's pleasure, and incidentally to the in- 
itself perception of  the proper sensible. Aristotle indicates this middle term 
481 have in mind here, for example, the random movement of the tentades of a sea anemone, 
which, with luck, result in the perception of  its food. Compare DA 434a4-5: "How could phantas/a 
be in [the lowest animals]? Or  just  as they move in an indefinite way [aor/st6s], so are these 
[p/mn/asm and ep/thum/a] present in them, but  present in an indefinite way?" 
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here by referring to the animal's eating its prey or having a meal; the middle 
term is clearly a mental experience which is in some sense of  these activities, 
occasioned not by the activities themselves (which are in the future) but by a 
p h a ~ .  
Thus there seem to be two mental predications at work in the examples 
Aristotle cites. Because Aristotle holds, as we have seen, that what we find 
pleasant insofar as we are hungry is the hot and dry, I suggest that we can 
formulate the two mental predications involved in the first example as follows: 
(1) the odoriferous is hot-and-dry and (9) the hot-and-dry is pleasant. The first of  
these is an incidental perception made possible by a past simultaneous percep- 
tion of  the odoriferous and the hot-and-dry, and involves a phantasma corre- 
sponding to the hot-and-dry. The  second is a mental experience made possi- 
ble by a past experience of  eating, which at that time produced a complex 
phantasma corresponding to the predication of  the pleasant of  the tactile experi- 
ence, the hot-and-dry. On Aristotle's account, the animal performs some mental 
operation similar to inference in coming mentally to predic.ate the pleasant of 
the odoriferous; in so doing, the animal has an impulse to pursue the odorifer- 
ous object. (The terms of  the mental predications involved in this inference 
are, let it be remembered,  unconceptualized.) 
How are we to understand the temporal relation of  the two mental predica- 
tions that serve as premises in the quasi-syllogism discussed above? That is to 
say, are we to suppose that the incidental perception of  the hot-and-dry 
evokes the phantasma that occasions the mental predication the hot-and-dry is 
pleasant, that is, evokes the desire for hot-and-dry, that is, evokes the animal's 
hunger? Or are we to suppose that the animal's bodily condition had itself 
already evoked the phantasma (and the attendant hunger), and that the inciden- 
tal perception of  the hot-and-dry merely gave some direction to its otherwise 
random movements in search of  satisfaction? Clearly both scenarios are possi- 
ble; they correspond to the two cases of  simple desire discussed above. It is 
reasonable to suppose that sometimes an animal's desire is prompted by the 
perception of  something in its environment, while at other times its own 
bodily condition is sufficient. 
Aristotle nowhere explicitly discusses the difference between the two cases 
I have just  outlined. The distinction can, however, help clear up a confusion 
concerning Aristotle's view of  the role of  phantas/a in desire.49 More impor- 
49 The  existence of  these two different cases may be the source of the confusion that exists 
among scholars as to whether  phantas/a is always required in desire. (See, for example, Modrak, 
Power of Perception, ~ l o n .  6 t.) Sometimes Aristotle makes phantas/a one possible cognitive element 
in desire among many (MA 7ola5-6 ,  29 -3  o, 36, DA 433b1~); at other times he seems to say that it 
is always present in desire (DA 433b28-29,  MA 7oaal7-19) .  I have already argued that desire 
does not require pharaas/a. In cases where desire prompts locomotion, phantas/a will always be 
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tantly, it draws attention to the real difference Aristotle thinks obtains be- 
tween deliberated h u m a n  action and even the most complicated animal action. 
Deliberated action resembles in one respect the case in which an animal's 
bodily condition evokes a desire unconnected to what it actually perceives: 
deliberation characteristically starts f rom a desire which is not  yet focussed on 
any object one currently perceives. Whereas the n o n h u m a n  animal is essen- 
tially passive, however, in that it is dependen t  on something's turning up in its 
perceptual field that it associates with the object of  its desire, the deliberator 
can actively reason back f rom the object of  her  desire to various ways it might  
be realized in her  present circumstances. At every step o f  her  reasoning her  
general knowledge is brought  to bear on her particular situation.5~ Such calcu- 
lation involves consciously considering general propositions of  various sorts; 
hence, it involves the use of  concepts. Fur thermore ,  if general propositions 
(e.g., causal ones) are to be applied to what is desired, the desired object itself 
must  be conceptualized. Therefore  the desire that gives rise to deliberation 
must  be a cognition that  explicitly involves concepts. 
7. C O N C E P T U A L I Z E D  D E S I R E  
Desire, as we have seen, is on Aristotle's account a mental  predication, o f  
which both terms can be unconceptualized. I f  deliberation is to take place, 
then the subject term must  be conceptualized. The  predicate term need not, 
however. One  may mentally predicate the unconceptualized mental experi- 
ence the pleasant of  a conceptualized subject, proceed to think certain causal 
propositions relevant to attaining what corresponds to that  subject, and ulti- 
mately act in order  to attain it. Interest ing cases of  weakness of  will often 
involve desire and  deliberation of  this sort, as I shall argue below. In this 
section I shall be concerned more specifically with desires in which the predi- 
cate term is conceptualized. For while desires with conceptualized subjects and 
unconceptualized predicates can give rise to calculation and, therefore,  to 
actions o f  greater complexity than desires with unconceptualized subjects, 
nonetheless they are not, as desires, d i f ferent  in kind f rom the other sorts o f  
desires studied so far. What  makes a mental  predication a desire is its conative 
predicate, and all the desires so far discussed share the same, uncon- 
ceptualized conative predicate: the pleasant. The  desire which is different  in 
involved, for the pleasant in such cases is perceived incidentally, which involves a phantasma. 
(Cases of locomotive desire are by far the most common, and k is with these that Aristotle is 
concerned in DA 433b~8-e9 and MA 7o~al 7-19.) Within the class of locomotive desires, some 
are instigated by perception, others are evoked purely internally, by m e a n s  of phantas/a alone. 
When Aristotle contrasts perception with phantas/a in the origination of locomotive desire, he 
usually has this latter contrast in mind. 
~o See Meta. Z. 7.1o35b15- 31 for a clear example of such deliberation. 
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kind from all these, and which, as desire, is characteristically human, contains 
a conceptualized conative predicate. This conceptualized conative predicate is, 
I suggest, the mental exercise of  the concept 'good'. I f  this is Aristotle's posi- 
tion, then there is a straightforward way to explicate his distinction between 
epithuraia and boul~sis. To say the former is desire of  the pleasant, the latter 
desire of  the good, is simply to say that the former is the mental predication of  
an unconceptualized, the latter the mental predication of  a conceptualized, 
conative predicate. 
The view of  Aristotelian bou/is/s here proposed interprets Aristotle's asso- 
ciation of  b0u/~s/s with logos and the logistilwn meros of the soul in a more modest 
way than is common in the recent literature.5~ On my view, boul~sis can be 
called "rational desire" only in a limited sense; it would perhaps be better to 
call it "conceptualized desire." A full critique of  the more robust interpreta- 
tion of  bou/~s/s as rational desire is beyond the scope of  this paper.5, I shall 
instead further explicate and defend my proposal by addressing a question 
that immediately arises for it, namely, that concerning the relation between 
the unconceptualized and the conceptualized conative predicates; that is, be- 
tween the pleasant and the good. 
The pleasant and the good are distinct conative mental predicates. Nonethe- 
less, it is not in the way they are conative, i.e., the way they motivate action, 
that they differ; they differ only in their mode of  cognition: the one is concep- 
tualized, and so involves thought, while the other is unconceptualized, and so 
involves perception (or phantasia aisth~tik~). In order to understand the sense 
in which the two mental predicates are alike, we must look more closely at the 
pleasant. 
In the case of  a nondesiderative predicative perception, e.g., the percep- 
tion which is the mental predication the white is sweet, there are sensibles in the 
world corresponding to the terms in the predication, namely, particular cases 
of  whiteness and of  sweetness (although that which gives rise to this percep- 
tion need be neither white nor sweet). But in the case of  a desiderative percep- 
tion, e.g., the predication the sweet is pleasant, there are no sensibles in the 
world, particular cases of "pleasantness," corresponding to the mental predi- 
cate. The  sugar is perceived as pleasant, as we pointed out earlier, due to a 
certain condition of  the body. Appealing to Aristotle's discussion of  pleasure 
s, See G. E. M. Anscombe, "Thought  and Action in Aristotle," in R. Bambrough, ed., New 
Es.mys on Plato and Aristotle (London, 1965), ]43-58,  and Terence Irwin, "First Principles in 
Aristode's Ethics," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 3 (i 978): 95a-7~, for influential statements of the 
common view, which construes ~ ,  roughly, as a desire for which the person with the desire 
can give reasons. 
5, I discuss one of  the major pieces of evidence for this interpretation, E N  , 149618--19, in 
section 8 below. 
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in the Nicomachean Ethics, we may make this more precise: the object is per- 
ceived to be pleasant because it occasions the excellent activity of  (one of) the 
animal's psychic capacities. Now for animals, the only psychic capacity whose 
activity can in itself give rise to perceptions of  the pleasant is that of  touch (i.e., 
eating and sex); among humans, the activity of  the other senses can do so, too. 
(So, too, can the exercise of  the capacity to think.) 
Now even though there is no sensible "pleasantness" existing indepen- 
dently in objects, we still have the mental experience of  the pleasant, which 
serves as a conative mental predicate in the way described. The repetition of  
this mental experience can in humans give rise to a concept, just as the re- 
peated experience of  the mental predicate the round can give rise to the con- 
cept 'round'. The conative concept that arises from the experience of  the 
pleasant is, I suggest, the concept 'good'.ss In this way Aristotle's theory of  
action preserves a certain unity: the distinction between epithumia and boul~sis 
does not turn on a distinction between two kinds of  attractiveness in things 
that can motivate us to action, but rather on the two different ways we can 
cognize the attractiveness of  things: either conceptually (through thinking) or 
nonconceptually (through perception or phantas/a). 
More light is shed on the way the pleasant and the good are related in a 
unified theory of  action, and on the conativity they share, by a passage in the 
De Motu Aniraalium: "The first cause of  movement is the object of  desire and 
the object of  thought. Not, however, every object of  thought, but only the end 
of  things done [te/os t~n pra/~6n]. Accordingly, it is goods of  this sort that 
initiate movement, not everything fine. For it initiates movement only so far as 
something is for its sake, or so far as it is the end of  that which is for the sake of  
something else. And we must suppose that the apparent good takes the posi- 
tion of  the good, as does the pleasant, which is itself an apparent good" 
(7oob23-29). Here Aristotle analyzes the conative concept 'good' as the con- 
cept 'end of  action', 'that for the sake of  which' other things are or are done.~ 
Cognizing something as an end of  action is, in itself, to be motivated to pursue 
it. (This, which might be called the "internalist position" with respect to motiva- 
tion, is what taking desire as cognitive comes to.) Cognition of  something as an 
end has motivating power no matter what modality of  cognition is in ques- 
tion.s5 But the kind of  desire such cognition constitutes will vary according to 
ss The  distinction between this concept and the concept 'pleasant' will be discussed below. 
s4 While inisisting on the muldvocity of "good," Aristode nevertheless maintains that  its vari- 
ous meanings are related in a nonarbitrary manner.  I find Berti's argument  that  all other mean- 
ings of "good" have reference to a primary or focal one, which is that of end, persuasive. See 
Enrico Berti, "Multiplidt6 et unit6 du bien selon E E I  8," in P. Moraux and D. Harlfinger, ed., 
Untersuchungen zur Eudemischen Ethik (Berlin, 1971), 157--84. 
5S Note that d/aru~ton here covers phantas/a and a/st~s/s as well as nous; see 7oob~9-2 I. 
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whether that cognition is unconceptualized (in which case the mental predi- 
cate is the pleasant) or conceptualized (the good). 
In the passage quoted above Aristotle refers to something cog~ized as 
good as an apparent good. He seems also to distinguish two different kinds of  
apparent good, the pleasant and some other kind; but he does not give any 
explanation of  this distinction. A similar passage in the Eudemian Ethics helps 
provide the explanation: "The object of  desire and wish [to 0rekton kai bou/~ton] 
is either the good or the apparent good [to phainomenon agathon]. Now this is 
why the pleasant is an object of  desire; for it is something that appears good 
[phainomenon... ti agathon]. For while some people have this opinion of  it, to 
others it appears good, even if they do not have this opinion of  it. For appear- 
ance [phantas/a] and opinion [dora] do not reside in the same part of  the soul" 
(EE 1 ~35b95-99). Here, too, the pleasant is said to be one kind of  apparent 
good. But as the passage continues it becomes clear that the pleasant can be 
called an apparent good for two reasons. On the one hand, anything that is 
desired must be cognized as an end (that is, it must have a conative predicate 
mentally predicated of  it). In this sense the mental subject of  a botd2sis is as 
much an apparent good as the mental subject of  an ep/thum~.56 But the pleas- 
ant is also a phainoraenon agathon in the technical sense, for the pleasant is the 
form the conative predicate takes when it is cognized, nonconceptually, by 
phantas/a.57 Because such cognition is not conceptualized, for something to 
appear good to one in this restricted sense does not entail that one has the 
belief that that thing is good; indeed, as Aristotle points out here, one may 
believe that it is bad. It is this difference in the way the good can be cognized 
that allows Aristotle to recognize real conflicts of  desire while retaining his 
view that contradictory beliefs are contrary properties and so incapable of  
being simultaneously held (Meta. loo5b~6-32 ). 
It might be supposed that my account of  the concept 'good' as the concept 
corresponding to the perceptual experience the pleasant leaves no room for a 
distinct concept of  'pleasant'. This however is not so, for 'pleasant' and 'good' 
are different sorts o f  concepts: the latter is conative, while the former is not. 
To think something good (in the focal sense) is to cognize it as an end of  
action, and thereby to have an impulse to pursue it. The same holds of  perceiv- 
ing it or "phantasizing" it to be pleasant. But thinking of.an object as pleasant 
does not have this conative dimension. It is simply to think of the object as 
being such that, in some circumstances, perceiving it or "phantasizing" it 
56See EN 1113a23-24: "Are we to say that absolutely and in truth the good is the object.of 
wish [to bou//ton], but for each person what appears good [to pha/nomenon]?" 
s~ On the analysis offered above, only the most elementary perception of the pleasant (i.e., by 
touch) takes place without the assistance of phantas/a. In any tp/thum/a that prompts locomotion 
the conative mental predicate will be cognized by phantas/a. 
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would result in the perception or phant~ia of it as pleasantsS (that is, in the 
mental predication of  the unconceptualized predicate the pleasant of  the men- 
tal subject corresponding to it). Thinking an object pleasant may, on the other 
hand, lead one to have the corresponding phantas/a of it (if one is in the right 
condition), and so to have an epi~umia for it; but it need not. At the level of  
thought only the concept of  'good' has intrinsic motivating force.59 
I have so far argued that what makes a desire a boul~sis is its having a 
conceptualized conative predicate. I conclude my discussion of  boul~sis with a 
few remarks about the subject term in the mental predication that is a boul~sis. 
This mental subject may be either conceptualized or unconceptualized. If  it is 
unconceptualized, then the boul~sis in which it figures cannot give rise to 
deliberation. Furthermore, any deliberation that results from a b o u / ~  with 
two conceptualized terms must end in a mental predication with an uncon- 
ceptualized subject if that deliberation is to issue in action. For only when the 
mental subject is an experience occasioned by a sensible in one's environment 
is there a direction for the impulse to action involved in the conative predicate. 
A process of  deliberation issuing in action terminates when one has mentally 
predicated good of  some experience occasioned by a sensible, v/a a succession 
of  middle terms (involved in the thinking of  various propositions); this ulti- 
mate bou/~s/s is a prohairesis. 6~ 
This completes my account of  the difference between epithumia and b0u/~s/s 
in terms of  the difference in the cognition of the conative predicate in a mental 
predication. I now turn to showing how this account of Aristotelian desire may 
help us understand Aristotle's Views on weakness of will and moral education. 
8 .  WEAKNESS OF WILL 
My purpose here is not to treat fully this vexatious topic in AristotlCs moral 
psychology, but merely to suggest what light the proposed interpretation of  
boul~sis and epithumia may shed on it. Now in his phusik~teron account of  akras/a in 
ss The  concept 'pleasant' is thus in one sense more complex than the concept 'good', in that 
its analysis refers to certain modes of cognition (see DA 431alo--I ~). Its acquisition will there- 
fore involve some kind of  reflexivity, as does, presumably, the acquisition of such concepts as 
'perception' or 'belief'. Acquisition of the concept 'good' will not, on my account, require such 
reflexivity. 
s9 Is there any reflexive, nonconative concept that bears a relation to the conceptualized 
experience good similar to that which the concept 'pleasant' bears to the perceived or phantasized 
experience of the pleasant? Although I cannot pursue the point here, I suggest that the concept 
'fine' (ka/on) may have such a role (among others) in Aristode's theory. For a discussion of 
passages where Aristode distinguishes the fine from the good, see D.J. Allan, "The Fine and the 
Good in the Eudemian Ethics," in Moraux and Harlfinger, Untersuchungen zur Eudemischen Ethik, 
63-71 . 
6o Some bou/~se/s of  particular perceived things are not preceded by deliberation; cf. EE 
x a24a3-  4, 1226b3- 4. As these passages show, Aristotle refuses to call such desires prohaireseis. 
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EN VII. 3, Aristotle pictures two competing motivations at work in the case of  
the incontinent agent: "When the universal opinion is present, restraining one 
from tasting, and there is also the opinion that everything sweet is pleasant, and 
that this is sweet (and this opinion is active), and ep/thum/a happens to be pres- 
ent, the one opinion bids one avoid the object, but epithumia leads one on" 
(1147a31-34)- Since Aristotle repeatedly tells us that the incontinent acts para 
boul~sin, we may assume that the "universal opinion" restraining the agent from 
tasting is a boul~sis which is a cognition of  the eating of  the thing as bad. It seems 
unlikely, however, that epithumia is to be identified with the opinion that every- 
thing sweet is pleasant, because Aristotle seems to mention this opinion and 
epithuraia as two distinct items. This opinion, then, is simply a fully conceptual- 
ized, nonconative belief. The second opinion mentioned here on the side of  the 
incontinent action, that this is sweet, would seem to be a case of  incidental 
perception, where the predicate is conceptualized: the agent perceives in him- 
self some feature(s) o f  the object (e.g., its color and shape) which evoke in him a 
mental experience of  the concept 'sweet') '  What we have so far, then, is the 
(incidental) perception that something is sweet, with the general belief that the 
sweet is pleasant, and so the materials for the inference that this thing is pleas- 
ant. But since the pleasant in the major premise is conceptualized, it has no 
conative force; therefore it has none in the conclusion, either. That is why we 
need the additional mention of  the presence of  ep/thum/a, for epi~umia involves 
precisely that cognition of  the pleasant that has conative force. Therefore I 
think we must suppose that the belief that this thing is pleasant (where the 
corresponding mental predicate is conceptualized) evokes the "phantasized" 
mental experience that this thing is pleasant (unconceptualized). As I men- 
tioned before, beliefs of  this sort do not always evoke phanta~/a/to match; much 
will depend on the individual's bodily condition, her character, and other fac- 
tors. This contingency is suggested by Aristotle's expression "epithumia happens 
to be present [ tuch~. . .  enousa]." 
In this example of  weakness of  will it does not appear that the agent 
deliberates how to attain her incontinent goal; the perception of  the sweet 
object triggers the action. But in another passage Aristotle does seem to recog- 
nize that incontinent action can be the product of  deliberation: "The inconti- 
nent person, and the bad person, if clever, will get what he proposes through 
calculation [ek tou logismou]" (EN 1142bi8-I9). This passage has been taken to 
show that a boul~sis involves more than taking the object of  your desire as 
61 This sort of incidental perception is different from that in. which the incidental sensible is 
merely phantasized--though the latter may mediate the former. The incidental sensible must be 
conceptualized if the incidental perception is to be subsumed under the fully conceptualized 
predication the sweet is pleasant. 
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good; 6' for here  an incontinent person, acting presumably against his boul~sis, 
acts in accordance with his deliberative calculation and the desire which gave 
rise to it. It  is a fair inference f rom these facts, I think, that the desire f rom 
which the deliberation took rise'was not a bou/~s/s (and so, for purposes o f  
illustration, may be taken to be an epithumia). But once we realize that even a 
desire without a conceptualized predicate can give rise to deliberation, there is 
no need to suppose that  the desire f rom which the deliberation arose was one 
in which the agent  thought of  the desired object as good. For as long as the 
epithumia in question has a conceptualized sub_aject, it can give rise to delibera- 
tion. There fore  the passage provides no reason to think that a boule.sis is 
anything more  than a desire in which the desired object is thought  to be good. 
The  account o f  "incontinent deliberation" is a plausible one that fits, I 
suggest, some cases of  weakness of  will. A person may think of  something 
which she thinks bad ( = boul~sis restraining her), and at the same time may 
phantasize it as pleasant ( = epithumia). She may then deliberate how to attain 
the object, never consciously thinking that it would be good to attain it. It  is 
easy to see that  she could then actually perform the deliberated deed, without 
ever having "decided" to pursue the goal at all. I f  Aristode is alluding to 
actions that manifest  weakness o f  will in this way, then this passage is perfecdy 
intelligible on the basis o f  the account of  boul~sis and epithumia given above. 
9" M O R A L  E D U C A T I O N  
Bou/~s/s, on the above interpretation, requires at least one concept, that of  the 
good; hence those who do not possess concepts, for example infants and 
n o n h u m a n  animals, do not have bou/~se/s. Infants do, however, have epithumia, 
which involves the cognition o f  the attractiveness of  things through sense- 
perception or  phantasia. This nonconceptualized cognition o f  the good serves 
as the experiential basis for the child's coming to possess the concept 'good'. I t  
would seem natural ,  then, for the child's first boul~seu to have much the Same 
objects as its epithumiai. I f  this situation is not  addressed by moral education, 
then the things an individual finds good may continue to be just  those things 
that appear  good (i.e., are pleasant) to n o n h u ma n  animals: the things that 
satisfy basic bodily appetites. Aristotle makes this point in a passage in the 
Nicomachean Ethics: "Tha t  which is in t ruth an object of wish [to kat' alktheian sc. 
bou/~ton] is an object o f  wish to the good person, while any chance thing may be 
so to the bad person . . . .  But in the case of  the many the error  seems to come 
about because o f  pleasure. For it appears a good when it is not. There fore  
they choose [hairountat] the pleasant as a good [hOs agathon], and avoid pain as 
Anscornbe, "Thought and Action in Aristotle," seems to have been the first to draw atten- 
tion to this passage and to propose the interpretation here discussed. 
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an evil [h~s ka~on]" (EN I 113a95-26, 33-b2). But b ~  does not always take 
its lead from ep/thum/a. Once one has the concept o f  the good, one can, under 
the influence of  parents, etc., come to be//eve that some things are good which 
do not appear, through perception or phantas/a, good to one. I f  in fact such 
things appear bad (i.e., painful) to one, then the stage is set for a conflict of  
desires. The moral education of  most people progresses only this far; hence 
most people are incontinent (akrat~s) or continent (enkrat~s). 
Moral education need not stop there. For not only can epithurnia influence 
the objects one thinks good, b ~  can influence the objects that appear to 
one as pleasant. Unlike such erroneous appearances as the visible size of  the 
sun,~ sensible appearances of  the good can be modified by sincerely held 
opinions about the good. Thus moral education, by inculcating and reinforc- 
ing the proper opinions about the good, can also influence the appearances of  
the good, that is, a person's ep~.hu~7~,/.64 
These two moments of  moral education are evident in a passage from the 
Eudemian Ethics: "While what is good absolutely is choiceworthy absolutely, 
what is good to oneself is what is choiceworthy for one. These things must be in 
harmony. And virtue brings this about, and the political art exists to this end, to 
bring this about in those in whom as yet it does not exist . . . .  And the road is 
through the pleasant; the noble must be pleasant. And when these are out of  
harmony a person is not yet perfectly good. For incontinence may arise; for the 
disharmony of  the good with the pleasant in the passions constitutes inconti- 
nence" (EE 1236b39-1237a3, 6-9). I suggest that the two references to har- 
mony in this passage are to two different kinds of  harmony. In the first half of  
the passage, Aristotle tells us of  the need for one's views of  the good to be 
correct; that is, the apparent good in our bou/~e/s must be what is really good. In 
the second half of  the passage Aristotle refers to the harmony needed between 
what we think good and what appears good to us in phantas/a or perception, i.e., 
what we find pleasant. This harmony is one between our bou/~se/s and our 
epithumiai.65 The virtuous person is characterized by both sorts of  harmony. 
See DA 428bs-4, De Insomniis 46ob16-2o. 
The view that a nonconceptualized cognition is needed for ep/thum/a, and that a person with 
the correct conceptualized cognition can work to achieve such nonconceptualized cognition, is 
also represented by Posidonius, the first-century B.c. Stoic who reverted to a Platonico-Aris- 
totelian moral psychology: "How could someone move the irrational part [of the soul] with 
reasoning [/og&], unless one adds to it a vivid picture [ a n a ~ g r a ~ ]  similar to one perceived by 
sense?" (F 162 in L. Edelstein and I. G. Kidd, ed., Posidonius: The Fragraent~ [Cambridge, x989']; 
cf. phantas/as in the same fragment). 
e~ See EN 1119 b 15-18: "Therefore the faculty of ep/thum/a in the temperate person should 
agree with/og0s; for the noble is the mark at which both aim, and the temperate person desires 
[ep/thunm'] the things he ought, as he ought, and when he ought; and this is what/og0s, too, 
ordains." 
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~O. CONCLUSION 
Aristotelian desire is a special kind of cognition: a mental predication with a 
conative predicate. I have tried to show that the distinction between the two 
main types of Aristotelian desire, epithumia and boul~sis, is based on the more 
fundamental division between the two ways in which the conative predicate 
can be cognized: conceptually or in unconceptualized form. Lastly I have 
briefly suggested how this interpretation of the distinction may shed light on 
Aristotle's views of  weakness of will and of moral education. 
One value of the theory I attribute to Aristotle is that it treats the distinc- 
tion between the two main kinds of  desire not as irreducibly given, but as a 
consequence of our twofold cognitive capacity. This attraction will be merely 
specious, however, until it is shown how the third kind of  Aristotelian desire, 
thumos, fits into the picture. This project is beyond the scope of this essay; the 
general lines along which it can be carried out, however, are as follows. Thumos 
is not a fundamental kind of desire in the way the other two Aristotelian 
desires are, in spite of Aristotle's occasionally availing himself of the tradi- 
tional Academic tripartition that suggests that all three are equally fundamen- 
tal. Rather thumos is more at home in Aristotle's theory of action as one of the 
emotions, which are all treated by Aristotle as rather complicated combina- 
tions of  beliefs, perceptions, and desires of the two fundamental sorts. Thumos 
and the other emotions can motivate action, to be sure; they do not do so by 
means of any other fundamental desires than boulk.sis or epithuraia. 
If  my interpretation is correct, we can see that Aristotle's concern in the an- 
alysis of  desire is rather different from that of most contemporary philosophers 
of mind. Aristotle takes as fundamental the twofold cognitive capacity of hu- 
man beings; contemporary philosophers do not, as a rule, have any single fun- 
damental criterion for the recognition of  distinct primitive psychological atti- 
tudes that would distinguish kinds of  desire. For Aristotle, on the other hand, 
just as the difference between sensing or "phantasizing" the world and thinking 
about it is crucial in purely theoretical contexts, so it is when what is being 
cognized is the attractiveness of things in the world. It stands to reason that he 
should have made this distinction the basis of his analysis of the fundamental 
kinds of  desire. Its usefulness in Aristotle's treatments of  weakness of  will and 
moral education shows that this analysis is a philosophically fruitful one. 66 
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